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Abstract
In this paper we discuss some of the issues concern-
ing the Memory and Content aspects in the recent debate
on the identification of a Standard Model of the Mind
(Laird, Lebiere, and Rosenbloom in press). In particular we
focus on the representational models concerning the Declar-
ative Memories of current Cognitive Architectures (CAs). In
doing so we outline some of the main problems affecting the
current CAs and suggest that the Conceptual Spaces, a rep-
resentational framework developed by Ga¨rdenfors, is worth-
considering to address such problems. Finally we briefly ana-
lyze the alternative representational assumptions employed in
the three CAs constituting the current baseline for the Stan-
dard Model (i.e. SOAR, ACT-R and Sigma). In doing so, we
point out the respective differences and discuss their implica-
tions in the light of the analyzed problems.
Introduction
In the last decades, many Cognitive Architectures (CAs)
have been realized adopting different assumptions about the
organization and the representation of their knowledge level.
Some of them adopt a symbolic approach, some are based
on a purely connectionist model, while others adopt a hy-
brid approach combining connectionist and symbolic rep-
resentational levels. In this paper we suggest that, among
the different approaches that are worth-considering in the
debate concerning the identification of a standard represen-
tational model in artificial minds, the framework of Con-
ceptual Spaces can play an important role for connecting
symbolic, subsymbolic and diagrammatic representations
and for dealing with some problematic aspects affecting the
knowledge level in CAs. Finally, we analyze the alterna-
tive representational models that have been employed in the
three CAs constituting the baseline of the current Standard
Model, by pointing out the respective differences and their
implications.
Representational Limits of current CAs
It has been recently argued that two of the main cur-
rent limitations of the knowledge level of the CAs
are represented by the limited size and the homoge-
neous typology of the encoded and processed knowledge
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(Lieto, Lebiere, and Oltramari 2017). While the size prob-
lem corresponds to the fact that CAs usually operate with
very limited and ad-hoc built knowledge bases, the problem
concerning the homogeneity issue concerns the fact that usu-
ally the type of knowledge represented and manipulated by
most CAs (including those provided with extended knowl-
edge modules) mainly covers the so called classical part
of conceptual information (i.e. that one representing con-
cepts in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions, see
(Frixione and Lieto 2012) on these aspects). On the other
hand, the so called common-sense knowledge components
(i.e. those that, based on the results from the cognitive sci-
ence, allow to characterize concepts in terms of prototypes,
exemplars or theories, see (Murphy 2002)) is largely absent
in such computational frameworks1.
As a consequence of this representational aspect, these
systems have also a limited capacity of handling, in an
integrated way, the heterogeneous amount of co-existing
common-sense reasoning mechanisms which are, on the
other hand, well established in the psychological litera-
ture. Such mechanisms belongs to the class of typicality-
based reasoning (and includes, for example, prototype and
exemplar-based categorization).2
1There are, however, some proposals explicitly suggesting to
deal with this problem by assuming a heterogeneous represen-
tational stance (Lieto 2014). According to the heterogeneous ap-
proach a given concept is endowed by different types of potentially
co-existing representations (e.g. prototypes, exemplars etc.). In ad-
dition, to each type of representation is associated a corresponding
reasoning mechanisms. Handling the interaction between all these
reasoning mechanisms represents a crucial aspect of the heteroge-
neous proposal. In the rest of the paper we assume the heteroge-
neous representational stance as a way to deal with the knowledge
homogeneity problem.
2A prototype-based categorization is obtained, for example,
when a stimulus with the following features: “it has fur, woofs and
wags its tail” is categorized ad a DOG, since these cues are as-
sociated to the prototype of dog. Prototype-based reasoning, how-
ever, is not the only type of reasoning based on typicality. In fact,
if an exemplar corresponding to the stimulus being categorized is
available, too, it is acknowledged that humans use to classify it by
evaluating its similarity w.r.t. the exemplar, rather than w.r.t. the
prototype associated to the underlying concepts. This type of com-
mon sense categorization is known in literature as exemplars-based
categorization (and the phenomenon according to which the exem-
An Intermediate Conceptual Spaces Level
In our opinion, a possible way to deal with the above men-
tioned problems can be provided by the adoption of Concep-
tual Space representations (integrated with other represen-
tational formalisms). Conceptual Spaces (Ga¨rdenfors 2000)
have been proposed as an intermediate level of representa-
tion between the subsymbolic and symbolic levels. It has
been argued that the integration of this level enables to over-
come some classical problems specifically related to the sub-
symbolic and symbolic representations considered in isola-
tion (Ga¨rdenfors 2000). Conceptual Spaces are a geometri-
cal framework for the representation of knowledge3 and can
be thought as a metric space in which entities are charac-
terized by quality dimensions (Ga¨rdenfors 2000). To each
quality dimension is associated a geometrical (topological
or metrical) structure. In some cases, such dimensions can
be directly related to perceptual mechanisms; examples of
this kind are temperature, weight, brightness, pitch. In other
cases, dimensions can be more abstract in nature. In this
setting, concepts correspond to convex regions, and regions
with different geometrical properties correspond to different
sorts of concepts (Ga¨rdenfors 2000). Here, prototypes and
prototypical reasoning have a natural geometrical interpre-
tation: prototypes correspond to the geometrical center of
a convex region (the centroid). Also exemplar-based repre-
sentation can be represented as points in a multidimensional
space, and their similarity can be computed as the interven-
ing distance between two points, based on some suitable
metrics (such as Euclidean and Manhattan distance etc.).
Recently some available conceptual categorization sys-
tems, explicitly assuming the heterogeneous representa-
tional hypothesis and coupling Conceptual Spaces rep-
resentations and symbolic knowledge bases (i.e. ontolo-
gies), have been developed. The DUAL PECCS system
(Lieto, Radicioni, and Rho 2017), for example, relies on
both such assumptions. Such system has been integrated
with the Declarative Memories and the knowledge process-
ing mechanisms of different CAs (ACT-R and CLARION).
In DUAL PECCS, the interaction of the common-sense cat-
egorization strategies (based on prototypes and exemplars
representation and operating on Conceptual Spaces repre-
sentations) and classical deductive categorization mecha-
nisms (executed on the ontological representations) is ex-
plicitly provided. This aspect is of particular interest in light
of the problem concerning the homogeneity of the encoded
knowledge. In fact, since the design of the interaction of the
different processes operating with heterogeneous represen-
tations still represents a largely ignored problem in current
CAs, this system shows that Conceptual Spaces represent a
relatively effortless framework to both i) model the dynam-
ics between prototype and exemplar-based processes and ii)
plar is favoured with respect to the prototype is known as old-item
advantage effect). See (Frixione and Lieto 2013) on this aspect.
3In the last fifteen years, such framework has been
employed in a vast range of AI applications spanning
from visual perception (Chella, Frixione, and Gaglio 1997)
to robotics (Chella, Frixione, and Gaglio 2003), ques-
tion answering (Lieto, Radicioni, and Rho 2015) etc. See
(Zenker and Ga¨rdenfors 2015) for a recent overview.
connect such mechanisms with processes operating on dif-
ferent types of representational formalisms (i.e. the symbolic
or logic-oriented ones) that are more suitable to represent
conceptual information in classical terms.
Concerning the size problem, the possible ground-
ing of the Conceptual Spaces representational frame-
work with symbolic structures enables their inte-
gration with wide-coverage knowledge bases such
CYC (as provided, for example, in DUAL PECCS
(Lieto, Radicioni, and Rho 2017)), DBpedia or similar.
Additionally, there are also some initial attempts to au-
tomatically learn and encode wide-coverage Conceptual
Spaces knowledge bases (Derrac and Schockaert 2015)
also starting by wide-coverage linguistic resources such as
BabelNet (http://babelnet.org/) and ConceptNet
(http://conceptnet5.media.mit.edu/), see
(Lieto, Mensa, and Radicioni 2016). Despite the recent
progresses in this sense, however, we acknowledge that
there is still a gap to cover in order to produce knowledge
bases encoded in terms of Conceptual Spaces that can be
comparable with the sizes of the wide-coverage ontological
Knowledge Bases (KBs) mentioned above. In principle,
however, this framework seems suitable to deal with both
the size and the knowledge homogeneity issues.
An additional element of interest concerning the advan-
tages provided by introducing the Conceptual Spaces as an
intermediate representational level in CAs regards its capa-
bility to address a classical problem in conceptualization:
namely the problem of reconciling compositionally and typ-
icality effects 4. This aspect does not affect, per se, the
size problem but the problem concerning the knowledge
homogeneity (since it assumes the existence of typicality-
based representations). Such aspect has been shown to be
problematic for both symbolic/logic-oriented approaches
(Osherson and Smith 1981)) and for classical connectionist
approaches (Fodor and Pylyshyn 1988). On the other hand,
this aspect can be formally handled by recurring to Concep-
tual Spaces (as shown in (Lieto, Chella, and Frixione 2017;
Lewis and Lawry 2016).). In the next sections we briefly
outline some arguments additionally supporting the adop-
tion of a Conceptual Spaces representational level in CAs.
4Broadly speaking this aspect regards the problem of dealing, in
a coherent way, with the compositionality of prototypical represen-
tations. According to a well-known argument (Fodor 1981), proto-
types are not compositional. In brief, the argument runs as follows:
consider a concept like pet fish. It results from the composition of
the concept pet and the concept fish. However, the prototype of pet
fish cannot result from the composition of the prototypes of a pet
and a fish: a typical pet is furry and warm, a typical fish is grayish,
but a typical pet fish is neither furry and warm nor grayish. The
possibility of explaining, in a coherent way, this type of combi-
natorial and generative phenomenon highlights a crucial aspect of
the conceptual processing capabilities in human cognition and con-
cerns some crucial high-level cognitive abilities such as that ones
concerning conceptual composition, metaphor generation and cre-
ative thinking. Dealing with this problem requires the harmoniza-
tion of two conflicting requirements in representational systems:
the need of syntactic, generative, compositionality (typical of log-
ical and symbolic-oriented systems) and that one concerning the
Interpretation of Neural Networks
A relevant issue suggesting the adoption of Conceptual
Space in CAs is represented by the possibility of using this
representational layer as an interpreter of underlying opaque
artificial neural networks (ANN) representations, that, on the
other hand, are very well suited for tasks concerning percep-
tual abilities and are widely used in current CAs. We claim
that the theory of Conceptual Spaces can be considered as
a sort of designing style that helps to model more transpar-
ent neural networks, and it can facilitate the grounding and
the interpretation of the hidden layers of units. As a conse-
quence, the interpretation of neural network representations
in terms of Conceptual Spaces provides a more abstract and
transparent view on the underlying behavior of the networks.
Ga¨rdenfors (Ga¨rdenfors 2000) offers a simple analysis of
the relationship between Conceptual Spaces and Self Or-
ganising Maps. Hereafter, (Balkenius and Ga¨rdenfors 2016)
propose a more articulate interpretation of the widely
adopted RBF networks in terms of dimensions of a suitable
Conceptual Space According to this approach, a neural net-
work built by a set of RBF units can be interpreted as a sim-
ple Conceptual Space described by a set of integral quality
dimensions. Consequently, a neural network built by a set
of sets of RBF units may be geometrically interpreted by a
conceptual space made up by sets of integral dimensions.
Additionally, following the Chorus of Prototypes ap-
proach proposed by Edelman (Edelman 1995), the units of
an RBF network can be interpreted as prototypes in a suit-
able Conceptual Space. This interpretation enables the mea-
surement of similarity between the input of the network and
the prototypes corresponding to the units. Such an interpre-
tation would have been much more problematic by con-
sidering the neural network alone, since this information
would have been implicit and hidden. Moreover, it is pos-
sible to take into account, for example, the delicate cases
of Chimeric entities, which are almost equidistant between
two or more prototypes (i.e. the lion and the goat) (see
(Edelman 1995)). This aspect is related to the PET FISH
example described in the previous section (footnote 4). In
this respect, the capability of accounting for the composi-
tionally based on typicality traits seems to be a crucial fea-
ture of the Conceptual Spaces empowering both symbolic
and sub-symbolic representations 5. An additional element
5It is worth-noting that also some forms of neuro-symbolic in-
tegration currently developed in CAs like ACT-R, and belonging
to the class of the neo-connectionist approaches, allows to deal
with the the above mentioned problem by providing a series of
mechanisms that are able to deal with limited forms of compo-
sitionality in neural networks (O’Reilly et al. 2013) and that can
be integrated with additional processes allowing the compatibil-
ity with typicality effects. In this respect, such approaches play an
equivalent role w.r.t that one played by the Conceptual Spaces on
these issues. In addition, however, we claim that Conceptual Spaces
can offer a unifying framework for interpreting many kinds of di-
agrammatic and analogical representations (see the next section).
On these classes of representations, limited work has been done by
these hybrid neuro-symbolic systems (including ACT-R). This is
a symptom that the treatment of their representational and reason-
ing mechanisms is not trivial in these environments and that often
of interests come from the research in computational neuro-
science. According to a recent study (Reimann et al. 2017),
the brain processes information involving cliques of neurons
bound into cavities and reacts to external stimuli by build-
ing increasingly complex and multidimensional representa-
tions starting with rods (1D), then planks (2D), then cubes
(3D), and then more complex geometries with 4D, 5D, etc.
While the intuitive connection of this finding with the Con-
ceptual Spaces framework is quite evident, this anoalogy in
our opinion, deserves further attention.
Unifying Picture-Like Representations
Many pictorial, analog or diagrammatic models have been
proposed in various fields of Cognitive Science, which take
advantage of forms of representations that are picture-like,
in the sense that they spatially resemble to what they repre-
sent (Glasgow, Narayanan, and Chandrasekaran 1995).
This class of representations is heterogeneous, and it is
surely not majoritarian if compared to the main streams of
symbolic/logic based systems and of neural networks.More-
over, they lack a general theory, and, despite their intuitive
appeal, a common and well understood theoretical frame-
work does not exist.
Conceptual Spaces, thanks to their geometrical nature, al-
low the representation of this sort of information and offer,
at the same time a general, well understood and theoretically
grounded framework that could enable to encompassmost of
the existing diagrammatic representations.
The geometrical nature of conceptual spaces can be use-
ful also in representing more abstract and non-specifically
spatial domains and phenomena. A typical problem of both
symbolic and neural representations regards the ability to
track the identity of individual entities over time. The prop-
erties of an entity change across the time. At which condition
can we re-identify an entity as the same, despite its changes?
In many cases the answer is not easy. Conceptual Spaces
suggest a way to face the problem. We said that individ-
ual objects are represented by points in Conceptual Spaces.
However, in a dynamic perspective, objects can be rather
seen as trajectories in a suitable Conceptual Space indexed
by time, since the properties of objects usually change with
time. Objects may move, may age, an object can alter its
shape or color, and so on. As the properties of an object are
modified, the point, representing it in the Conceptual Space,
moves according to a certain trajectory. Since usually this
modifications happens smoothly and not abruptly, several
assumptions can be made on this trajectory, e.g., smooth-
ness, and obedience to physical laws (Chella et al. 2004).
Figuring out the evolution of an object as its future posi-
tion, or the way in which its features are going to change, can
be seen as the extrapolation of a trajectory in a Conceptual
Space. To identify again an object that has been occluded
for a certain time interval amounts to interpolate its past and
present trajectories. In general, this characteristic represents
a powerful heuristic to track the identity of an individual ob-
ject. Also in this case, crucial aspects of diagrammatic rep-
they need to be integrated with external diagrammatic representa-
tion systems, see (Lieto, Lebiere, and Oltramari 2017).
resentations find a more general and unifying interpretation
regarding Conceptual Spaces.
In the next sections we provide a brief overview of the
representational hypotheses adopted by the three different
CAs constituting the current baseline for the StandardModel
of Mind. In doing so we try to analyze to what extent such
systems deal with the problematic aspects discussed above.
SOAR
SOAR was considered by Newell a candidate for a Uni-
fied Theory of Cognition (Newell 1994). In such architec-
ture, all the cognitive tasks can be represented by prob-
lem spaces that are searched by production rules grouped
into operators. These production rules are fired in parallel
to produce reasoning cycles. From a representational per-
spective, SOAR exploits symbolic representations of knowl-
edge (called chunks) in its the declarative memory (called
Semantic Memory) and use pattern matching, and in the
more recent versions also spreading activation mechanisms
(Jones, Wandzel, and Laird 2016), to select relevant knowl-
edge elements.
With respect to the knowledge homogeneity issue, the
main problem of this architecture relies on the fact that it
does not specify how the typical knowledge components of
a concept (that can eventually be represented by adopting a
frame-like structure) and the corresponding non monotonic-
reasoning strategy can interact with possibly conflicting rep-
resentational and reasoning procedures characterizing other
conceptualisation of the same conceptual entity 6. In short it
assumes, like most of the symbolic-oriented CAs, the avail-
ability of a monolithic conceptual structure (e.g., a frame-
like prototype or a “classical” concept) without specifying
how such information can be integrated and harmonized
with other knowledge components to form the whole knowl-
edge spectrum characterizing a given concept. Therefore the
current version of the system is not able to deal, in an inte-
grated perspective, with prototype and exemplar-based cat-
egorization. With respect to to the size problem, the SOAR
knowledge level is also problematic. SOAR agents, in fact,
are not endowed with general knowledge. This problem is
acknowledged in (Laird 2012) but there is no available lit-
erature attesting progress in this respect 7. With respect to
the diagrammatic representations, finally, SOAR is equipped
with a visual imagery module.
ACT-R
ACT-R (Anderson et al. 2004) is a cognitive architecture ex-
plicitly inspired by theories and experimental results com-
ing from human cognition. Here the cognitive mechanisms
concerning the knowledge level emerge from the interaction
of two types of knowledge: declarative knowledge, which
6Let us think to the case of WHALE. A prototypical concep-
tualization would classify whales as a FISH (since a whale share
many typical traits with fishes). On the other hand, a classical con-
ceptualization would classify a whale as a MAMMAL.
7There are, however, attempts to extend in a efficient way the
Semantic Memory of SOAR with external lexical resources such
as, for example, Wordnet (Derbinsky, Laird, and Smith 2010).
encodes explicit facts that the system knows, and procedu-
ral knowledge, which encodes rules for processing declara-
tive knowledge. In particular, the declarative module is used
to store and retrieve pieces of information (called chunks,
composed of a type and a set of attribute-value pairs, simi-
lar to frame slots) in declarative memory. ACT-R employs a
subsymbolic activation of symbolic conceptual chunks rep-
resenting the encoded knowledge. Finally, the central pro-
duction system connects these modules by using a set of IF-
THEN production rules.
Differently from SOAR, ACT-R allows to represent the
information in terms of prototypes and exemplars and al-
low to perform, selectively, either prototype or exemplar-
based categorization. This means that the architecture al-
lows the modeller to manually specify which kind of catego-
rization strategy to employ according to his specific needs.
Such an architecture, however, only partially addresses the
homogeneity problem since it does not allow to represent,
jointly, these different types of common-sense representa-
tions conveying different types of information for the same
conceptual entity (i.e. it does not assume a heterogeneous
perspective). As a consequence, it is also not able to au-
tonomously decide which of the corresponding reasoning
procedures to activate (e.g. prototypes or exemplars) and to
provide a framework able to manage the interaction of such
different reasoning strategies (however its overall architec-
tural environment provides, at least in principle, the possibil-
ity of implementing cascade reasoning processes triggering
one another).
Even if some attempts exist concerning the design of har-
monization strategies between different types of common-
sense conceptual categorizations (e.g. exemplar-based and
rule-based, see (Anderson and Betz 2001)) however they do
not handle the problem concerning the interaction of the pro-
totype or exemplar-based processes according to the results
coming from experimental cognitive science (for example:
the old item effect, privileging exemplars w.r.t. prototypes is
not modeled. See footnote 2 on this aspect.). Summing up:
w.r.t. the homogeneity problem, the components needed to
fully reconcile the Heterogeneity approach with ACT-R are
available, however they have not been fully exploited yet.
Regarding the size problem: as for SOAR, ACT-R agents
are usually equipped with task-specific knowledge and not
with general cross-domain knowledge. In this respect some
relevant attempts to overcome this limitation have been re-
cently done by extending the Declarative Memory of the ar-
chitecture. They will be discussed below along with their
current implications.
Sigma
Sigma is a novel cognitive architecture that starts with
the same basic assumption of SOAR (Rosenbloom 2009)
and that blends lessons from ACT-R and SOAR with
what has been learned separately about graphical models
(Laird, Lebiere, and Rosenbloom in press).
In Sigma the long term memory, as well as the working
memory and perceptual and motor components is grounded
in graphical models and, in particular, in factor graphs (a
particular type of very efficient graphical models).
In general, the graphical models can be considered as a
class of symbolic representations, where the relations be-
tween concepts are weighted by their strength, calculated
through statistical computations.Within the symbolic AI tra-
dition, these models can be seen an attempt to mitigate, for
example, the problems concerning common-sense knowl-
edge reasoning8. With respect to the size and the homo-
geneity issues the current version of the architecture (being
also quite new w.r.t the others) seems to encounter problems
for both the aspects. At the best of our knowledge, in fact,
currently Sigma is not equipped for being extended or in-
tegrated with large scale general knowledge bases. With re-
spect to the heterogeneity issues, on the other hand, it allows
- in principle - to model forms of approximate reasoning
in an efficient way due to the underlying graphical model
used as a representational basis. Currently, however, it is
not equipped for dealing with, in an integrated way, typical-
ity based reasoning (combining prototypes and exemplars)
with standard, ”classical”, reasoning mechanisms. An inter-
esting aspect, that in our opinion, would be interesting to
investigate is to what extent the representational assumption
used in Sigma allows align this framework with another well
known-theory about the typicality of conceptual knowledge
and that is known as theory-theory 9. As for SOAR, finally,
also SIGMA supports picture-like visual imagery represen-
tations.
Extended Declarative Memories
Some initial efforts to deal with the size problem have
been done (notably all these efforts have been done with
ACT-R). To this class of works belongs that one pro-
posed by (Oltramari and Lebiere 2012), aiming at extend-
ing the knowledge layer of ACT-R with external ontolog-
ical content related to the event modelling; that one by
Salvucci (Salvucci 2014), aiming at enriching the knowl-
edge model of the Declarative Memory (DM) of ACT-
R with a world-level knowledge base such as DBpedia
(i.e. the semantic version of Wikipedia represented in
terms of ontological formalisms), and that one proposed
in (Ball, Rodgers, and Gluck 2004) presenting an integra-
tion of the ACT-R Declarative and Procedural Memory with
the Cyc ontology http://www.opencyc.org/ (one of
the widest ontological resources currently available contain-
ing more than 230,000 concepts). The main problematic as-
pect concerning the extension of the DM with such wide-
coverage integrated ontological resources, however, is in
that the underlying formalisms of the ontological seman-
8It is also worth-noting, however, despite the success of the
recent statistical approaches in reproducing many cognitive phe-
nomena, that many forms of common-sense knowledge in human
cognition do not require predictions about what will happen or, in
general, to reason probabilistically (Sloman 2014). It would be in-
teresting to investigate how such architecture manages these cases.
9Theory-theory approaches (see (Murphy 2002) for details) ex-
plain the typicality effects by assuming that concepts consist of
more or less complex mental structures representing (among other
things) causal and explanatory relations. Common-sense concepts
are mostly characterized in terms of theories which are based on
arbitrary, i.e. experience-based, rules.
tics are mainly biased towards the representation of concep-
tual information in classical terms (for a more detailed dis-
cussion we remind to (Lieto, Lebiere, and Oltramari 2017).
Other attempts, aimed at extending the DM with knowledge
systems able to perform forms of common sense reasoning
(such as in in the integration of ACR-R with the SCONE
Knowledge Base, see (Oltramari and Lebiere 2012)), en-
counter different problematic issues. For example: with re-
spect to the extensions provided with wide-coverage KBs,
the latter approach needs to face the problem concerning the
size aspect (since KBs such as SCONE are not comparable
in size with Cyc or DBpedia). Concerning the homogeneity
problem, on the other hand, such integration seems to pro-
vide a straightforward way to combine common-sense rea-
soning operating with frame-like symbolic knowledge struc-
tures. Still, however, the problem concerning the integra-
tion of heterogeneous processes acting on different bodies
of knowledge is not currently addressed.
In the light of the arguments briefly presented above, it
can be argued that the current proposed solutions for deal-
ing with the size and the homogeneity knowledge problems
in CAs are not completely satisfactory. In particular, the
integrations with huge world-level ontological knowledge
bases can be considered a necessary solution for solving the
size problem. It is, however, insufficient for dealing with the
knowledge homogeneity issue and with the integration of the
common-sense conceptual mechanisms that, as assumed in
the heterogeneous representational perspective, are activated
on heterogeneous bodies of knowledge
Conclusion
We have provided some arguments supporting the idea
that Conceptual Spaces can be a powerful representational
framework for dealing with some problematic aspects affect-
ing the knowledge level in the current Long-TermMemories
of the CAs (i.e. the size and the knowledge homogeneity
problem). We have also sketched the advantages that such
framework, used in combination with symbolic, connection-
ist and diagrmmatic representations, may provide in gen-
eral CAs. In our opinion, such evidences support our claim
that any standard representational model of mind should be
equipped with a geometrical representational level a` la Con-
ceptual Spaces. In the final part of the paper we have pro-
posed an analysis of the representational level of the three
CAs currently considered for the development of a Standard
Model of the Mind. The analysis shows that, given the size
and the knowledge homogeneity problems, the current state
of the art is not completely satisfactory and could therefore
benefit from the adoption of Conceptual Spaces.
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